如何实现游戏反作弊
发表于：2026-11-03 作者：千家信息网编辑
千家信息网最后更新 2026年11月03日，本篇内容介绍了"如何实现游戏反作弊"的有关知识，在实际案例的操作过程中，不少人都会遇到这样的困境，接下来就让小编带领大家学习一下如何处理这些情况吧！希望大家仔细阅读，能够学有所成！进程与线程保护注册o
千家信息网最后更新 2026年11月03日如何实现游戏反作弊
本篇内容介绍了"如何实现游戏反作弊"的有关知识，在实际案例的操作过程中，不少人都会遇到这样的困境，接下来就让小编带领大家学习一下如何处理这些情况吧！希望大家仔细阅读，能够学有所成！
进程与线程保护
注册obg回调,去掉句柄,防止游戏被打开句柄:
NTSTATUS InstallCallBacks(){ NTSTATUS NtHandleCallback = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; NTSTATUS NtThreadCallback = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; OB_OPERATION_REGISTRATION OBOperationRegistration[2]; OB_CALLBACK_REGISTRATION OBOCallbackRegistration; REG_CONTEXT regContext; UNICODE_STRING usAltitude; memset(&OBOperationRegistration, 0, sizeof(OB_OPERATION_REGISTRATION)); memset(&OBOCallbackRegistration, 0, sizeof(OB_CALLBACK_REGISTRATION)); memset(®Context, 0, sizeof(REG_CONTEXT)); regContext.ulIndex = 1; regContext.Version = 120; RtlInitUnicodeString(&usAltitude, L"1000"); if ((USHORT)ObGetFilterVersion() == OB_FLT_REGISTRATION_VERSION) { OBOperationRegistration[1].ObjectType = PsProcessType; OBOperationRegistration[1].Operations = OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_CREATE | OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_DUPLICATE; OBOperationRegistration[1].PreOperation = MyHandleProcessCallbacks; OBOperationRegistration[1].PostOperation = HandleAfterCreat; OBOperationRegistration[0].ObjectType = PsThreadType; OBOperationRegistration[0].Operations = OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_CREATE | OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_DUPLICATE; OBOperationRegistration[0].PreOperation = MyHandleThreadCallbacks; OBOperationRegistration[0].PostOperation = HandleAfterCreat; OBOCallbackRegistration.Version = OB_FLT_REGISTRATION_VERSION; OBOCallbackRegistration.OperationRegistrationCount = 2; OBOCallbackRegistration.RegistrationContext = ®Context; OBOCallbackRegistration.OperationRegistration = OBOperationRegistration; NtHandleCallback = ObRegisterCallbacks(&OBOCallbackRegistration, &g_CallbacksHandle); // Register The CallBack if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtHandleCallback)) { if (g_CallbacksHandle) { ObUnRegisterCallbacks(g_CallbacksHandle); g_CallbacksHandle = NULL; } //DebugPrint("[DebugMessage] Failed to install ObRegisterCallbacks: 0xX.\n", NtHandleCallback); return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; } } return STATUS_SUCCESS;}回调代码如下:
OB_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS MyHandleProcessCallbacks(PVOID RegistrationContext, POB_PRE_OPERATION_INFORMATION OperationInformation){ if (g_StarterPid == (DWORD64)-1) return OB_PREOP_SUCCESS; PEPROCESS OpenedProcess = (PEPROCESS)OperationInformation->Object, CurrentProcess = PsGetCurrentProcess(); ULONG ulProcessId = (ULONG)PsGetProcessId(OpenedProcess); ULONG myProcessId = (ULONG)PsGetProcessId(CurrentProcess); if ((ulProcessId == (ULONG)g_FlagProcessPid || ulProcessId == (ULONG)g_StarterPid) && myProcessId != ulProcessId) { if (OperationInformation->Operation == OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_CREATE) { if ((OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.OriginalDesiredAccess & PROCESS_VM_OPERATION) == PROCESS_VM_OPERATION) { //Modify the address space of the process, such as by calling the user-mode WriteProcessMemory and VirtualProtectEx routines. OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.DesiredAccess &= ~PROCESS_VM_OPERATION; } if ((OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.OriginalDesiredAccess & PROCESS_VM_READ) == PROCESS_VM_READ) { //Read to the address space of the process, such as by calling the user-mode ReadProcessMemory routine. OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.DesiredAccess &= ~PROCESS_VM_READ; } if ((OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.OriginalDesiredAccess & PROCESS_VM_WRITE) == PROCESS_VM_WRITE) { //Write to the address space of the process, such as by calling the user-mode WriteProcessMemory routine. OperationInformation->Parameters->CreateHandleInformation.DesiredAccess &= ~PROCESS_VM_WRITE; } } } return OB_PREOP_SUCCESS;}R3的就打不开进程了.但是可以通过crss.exe、system.exe、steam.exe等打开,所以要有句柄降权
别忘了这个:
// 绕过MmVerifyCallbackFunction。 PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY64 ldr = (PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY64)DriverObject->DriverSection; ldr->Flags |= 0x20;
句柄降权
剥夺所有线程与进程的游戏操作权限
VOID StripHandlePermission(){ __try { CheckDebugPort(g_FlagProcessPid); CheckDebugPort((HANDLE)g_StarterPid); PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_EX HandleInfo = QueryHandleTable(); if (HandleInfo) { for (int i = 0; i < HandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; i++) { //7 是 process 属性 if (HandleInfo->Information[i].ObjectTypeNumber == 7 || HandleInfo->Information[i].ObjectTypeNumber == OB_TYPE_INDEX_PROCESS || HandleInfo->Information[i].ObjectTypeNumber == OB_TYPE_INDEX_THREAD) { if (g_FlagProcessPid == (HANDLE)-1) break; if (HandleInfo->Information[i].ProcessId == (ULONG)g_FlagProcessPid || HandleInfo->Information[i].ProcessId == 4) continue; bool bCheck = ((HandleInfo->Information[i].GrantedAccess & PROCESS_VM_READ) == PROCESS_VM_READ || (HandleInfo->Information[i].GrantedAccess & PROCESS_VM_OPERATION) == PROCESS_VM_OPERATION || (HandleInfo->Information[i].GrantedAccess & PROCESS_VM_WRITE) == PROCESS_VM_WRITE); PEPROCESS pEprocess = (PEPROCESS)HandleInfo->Information[i].Object; if (pEprocess) { HANDLE handle_pid = *(PHANDLE)((PUCHAR)pEprocess + g_OsData.UniqueProcessId); HANDLE handle_pid2 = *(PHANDLE)((PUCHAR)pEprocess + g_OsData.InheritedFromUniqueProcessId); if (bCheck && (handle_pid == g_FlagProcessPid || handle_pid2 == g_FlagProcessPid)) { pEprocess = NULL; NTSTATUS status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)HandleInfo->Information[i].ProcessId, &pEprocess); if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { //DebugPrint("Full Acess Handle! pid: %d \n", HandleInfo->Information[i].ProcessId); PHANDLE_TABLE HandleTable = *(PHANDLE_TABLE*)((PUCHAR)pEprocess + g_OsData.ObjTable); if (MmIsAddressValid((void*)HandleTable)) { ExEnumHandleTable(HandleTable, g_isWin7 ? (DWORD64*)&StripHandleCallback_win7 : (DWORD64*)&StripHandleCallback_win10, (PVOID)HandleInfo->Information[i].Handle, NULL); } ObDereferenceObject(pEprocess); } } } } } ExFreePoolWithTag(HandleInfo, POOL_TAG); } } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return; } }回调如下,win10和win7的不同:
BOOLEAN StripHandleCallback_win10( IN PHANDLE_TABLE HandleTable, IN PHANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY HandleTableEntry, IN HANDLE Handle, IN PVOID EnumParameter){ BOOLEAN result = FALSE; POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType = NULL; ULONG64 Object = 0; if (g_FlagProcessPid == (HANDLE)-1) return FALSE; if (ExpIsValidObjectEntry(HandleTableEntry)) { POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType = NULL; ULONG64 Object = 0; if (Handle == (HANDLE)EnumParameter) { HandleTableEntry->GrantedAccessBits = (SYNCHRONIZE | THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION); //DebugPrint("Fuck Handle: X \n", Handle); goto _exit; } } else { return FALSE; }_exit: // Release implicit locks _InterlockedExchangeAdd8((char*)&HandleTableEntry->VolatileLowValue, 1); // Set Unlocked flag to 1 if (HandleTable != NULL && HandleTable->HandleContentionEvent) ExfUnblockPushLock(&HandleTable->HandleContentionEvent, NULL); return FALSE;}BOOLEAN StripHandleCallback_win7(PHANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY HandleTableEntry, HANDLE Handle, PVOID EnumParameter){ POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType = NULL; ULONG64 Object = 0; if (g_FlagProcessPid == (HANDLE)-1) return FALSE; if (ExpIsValidObjectEntry(HandleTableEntry)) { if (Handle == (HANDLE)EnumParameter) { HandleTableEntry->GrantedAccessBits = (SYNCHRONIZE | THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION); //DebugPrint("Fuck Handle: X \n", Handle); return FALSE; } } return FALSE;}随机化进程名字
防止外挂通过进程名字得到pid
void randstring(char* randomString, size_t length) { static char charset[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"; ULONG seed = KeQueryTimeIncrement(); if (randomString) { for (int n = 0; n <= length; n++) { int key = RtlRandomEx(&seed) % (int)(sizeof(charset) - 1); randomString[n] = charset[key]; } //randomString[length] = '\0'; }}void FuckName(PUNICODE_STRING v1, WCHAR* ProcessName) { if (v1->Buffer != 0) { RtlZeroMemory(v1->Buffer, v1->MaximumLength); RtlCopyMemory(v1->Buffer, ProcessName, wcslen(ProcessName) * 2); v1->Length = wcslen(ProcessName) * 2; }}BOOLEAN PathSeAuditProcessCreationInfo(PEPROCESS Process, WCHAR* ProcessName) { PUNICODE_STRING Name; PUNICODE_STRING SelocateName; SeLocateProcessImageName(Process, &SelocateName); ExFreePool(SelocateName); Name = (PUNICODE_STRING)(*(PULONG_PTR)((ULONG_PTR)Process + g_OsData.SeAuditProcessCreationInfo));//+0x468 SeAuditProcessCreationInfo FuckName(Name, ProcessName); return TRUE;}BOOLEAN PatchImageFileName(PEPROCESS Process, char* cName){ char szNameBuff[15] = { 0 }; UCHAR* szProcessBuff = NULL; size_t cNamelen = 0; cNamelen = strlen(cName); RtlZeroMemory(szNameBuff, sizeof(szNameBuff)); if (cNamelen > 15) RtlCopyMemory(szNameBuff, cName, sizeof(szNameBuff)); else RtlCopyMemory(szNameBuff, cName, cNamelen); szProcessBuff = PsGetProcessImageFileName(Process); RtlZeroMemory(szProcessBuff, sizeof(szNameBuff)); RtlCopyMemory(szProcessBuff, szNameBuff, sizeof(szNameBuff)); return TRUE;}void PatchPEB(PEPROCESS Process, WCHAR* ProcessName) { KeAttachProcess((PEPROCESS)Process); DWORD64 _peb = *(PDWORD64)((PUCHAR)Process + g_OsData.peb); DWORD64 peb_ProcessParameters = *(PDWORD64)((ULONG_PTR)_peb + g_OsData.peb_ProcessParameters); PUNICODE_STRING peb_ImagePathName = (PUNICODE_STRING)((ULONG_PTR)peb_ProcessParameters + g_OsData.peb_ImagePathName); PUNICODE_STRING peb_WindowTitle = (PUNICODE_STRING)((ULONG_PTR)peb_ProcessParameters + g_OsData.peb_WindowTitle); PUNICODE_STRING peb_CommandLine = (PUNICODE_STRING)((ULONG_PTR)peb_ProcessParameters + g_OsData.peb_CommandLine); //PUNICODE_STRING peb_DllPath = (PUNICODE_STRING)((ULONG_PTR)peb_ProcessParameters + g_OsData.peb_DllPath); FuckName(peb_ImagePathName, ProcessName); FuckName(peb_WindowTitle, ProcessName); FuckName(peb_CommandLine, ProcessName); KeDetachProcess();}bool Win10ImageNamePoint(PEPROCESS Process, WCHAR* szFullName){ BOOLEAN bRet; PFILE_OBJECT pFileObject; pFileObject = (PFILE_OBJECT)(*(PULONG_PTR)((ULONG_PTR)Process + g_OsData.ImageFilePointer)); //+0x448 ImageFilePointer RtlZeroMemory(pFileObject->FileName.Buffer, pFileObject->FileName.MaximumLength); RtlCopyMemory(pFileObject->FileName.Buffer, szFullName, wcslen(szFullName) * 2); pFileObject->FileName.Length = wcslen(szFullName) * 2; return true;}BOOLEAN FuckProcessModify(HANDLE pid){ PEPROCESS Process = NULL; NTSTATUS status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)pid, &Process); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { return FALSE; } if (CheckProcessTermination(Process)) { return FALSE; } CHAR temp_char[10] = { 0x0 }; randstring(temp_char, 10 - 1); WCHAR temp_wchar[50] = { 0 }; status = RtlStringCbPrintfW(temp_wchar, 50, L"%hs", temp_char); if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) { PatchImageFileName(Process, temp_char); if (g_isWin7 == false) Win10ImageNamePoint(Process, temp_wchar); PathSeAuditProcessCreationInfo(Process, temp_wchar); PatchPEB(Process, temp_wchar); } ObDereferenceObject(Process); return TRUE;}在createprocessnotifycallbackex使用
反调试
检查进程是否被调试,eprocess->debugport,发现调试器直接蓝屏,BE是直接关游戏
VOID CheckDebugPort(HANDLE pid) { if (pid == (HANDLE)-1 || pid == (HANDLE)0) { return; } PEPROCESS process; NTSTATUS status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId(g_FlagProcessPid, &process); if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || process == NULL) return; ObDereferenceObject(process); if (CheckProcessTermination(process)) { return; } if (MmIsAddressValid((PULONG)((PUCHAR)process + g_OsData.ep_debugport))) { ULONG debug_port = *(PULONG)((PUCHAR)process + g_OsData.ep_debugport); if (debug_port != 0) { KeBugCheck(2); } }}反回调注入
让ImageLoadCallback无效,防止外挂在游戏启动时注入(注意win7 第一个版本会蓝屏)
ULONG64 GetNotifyVarAddress(){if (g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr == 0) {ULONG64 i = 0;PULONG64 pAddrOfFnc = 0;UNICODE_STRING fncName;//8B 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? A8 01 75 09 F0 0F BACHAR pattern_PspNotifyEnableMask[] = "\x8B\x05\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\xA8\x01\x75\x09\xF0\x0F\xBA";NTSTATUS status = UtilScanSection(g_KernelBase, "PAGE", (PCUCHAR)pattern_PspNotifyEnableMask, 0xCC, sizeof(pattern_PspNotifyEnableMask) - 1, (PVOID*)&g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr);if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)){//DebugPrint("[DebugMessAge] g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr not found! :( \n");return 0;}else {//g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr = g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr + 5;LONG OffsetAddr = 0;memcpy(&OffsetAddr, (UCHAR*)(g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr + 2), 4);pAddrOfFnc = (ULONG64*)(OffsetAddr + g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr + 0x6);//DebugPrint("[DebugMessAge] g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr : X \n", pAddrOfFnc);g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr = (ULONG64)pAddrOfFnc;return (ULONG64)g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr;}}else {return (ULONG64)g_PspNotifyEnableMaskAddr;}}VOID ChangeNotifyAddress(BOOLEAN enableImage){ ULONG64 varaddress = GetNotifyVarAddress(); if (varaddress) { //DebugPrint("[DebugMessage] NotifyVarAddress: X \n", varaddress); if (MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)*(ULONG*)(varaddress))) { return; } ULONG val = *(ULONG*)(varaddress); /* if (!enableThread) { UNSETBIT(val, 3); UNSETBIT(val, 4); } else { SETBIT(val, 3); SETBIT(val, 4); } */ if (!enableImage) { g_InvalidationLoadImage = true; UNSETBIT(val, 0); } else { g_InvalidationLoadImage = false; SETBIT(val, 0); } *(ULONG*)(varaddress) = val; } else { //DebugPrint("[DebugMessage] Can't find NotifyVarAddress \n"); }}具体原理百度PspNotifyEnableMask,这个是被PG保护的,所以不能一直关掉.启动后必须马上打开
Thread stack walk
回溯系统进程,判断是否是外挂线程
for (ULONG index = 4; index < 0x30000; index += 4) { PETHREAD ThreadObject; DWORD64 CurrtThreadAddress; if (!NT_SUCCESS(PsLookupThreadByThreadId((HANDLE)index, &ThreadObject))) continue; GetThreadStartAddress(ThreadObject, &CurrtThreadAddress); if (!MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)CurrtThreadAddress)) continue; if (!PsIsSystemThread(ThreadObject) || ThreadObject == KeGetCurrentThread()) { if (PsIsSystemThread(ThreadObject) && ThreadObject != KeGetCurrentThread()) { if (CurrtThreadAddress > *(PULONG)DUCK_ANTI_PASTE) { //如果这个地址在kernel speace里面,但是不是系统线程,dump它发到服务端 rpc::CallReportByThreadID(index,RESULT_FAKE_SYSTEMTHREAD); } } DWORD64 kthread_apc_state = *(PDWORD64)((ULONG_PTR)ThreadObject + g_OsData.thread_apcstate); if (!MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)kthread_apc_state)) continue; PEPROCESS apc_process = (PEPROCESS)((ULONG_PTR)kthread_apc_state + g_OsData.kacp_process); if (!MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)apc_process)) continue; if (apc_process) { HANDLE target_id = (HANDLE)PsGetProcessId(apc_process); //DebugPrint("apc_process addr = %p target_id: %p \n", apc_process, target_id); if (target_id == g_FlagProcessPid) { //DebugPrint("detect memeory read at thread addr = %p\n", thrd_id); //APC挂靠,多半是外挂在用MmCopyVirtualMemory,也就是所谓的驱动读写内核 rpc::CallReportByThreadID(index,RESULT_APC); } } if (CurrtThreadAddress && (memcmp((void*)start_addr, "\xFF\xE1", 2) == 0) && (CurrtThreadAddress < g_ntoskrnl_exe_base || CurrtThreadAddress > g_ntoskrnl_exe_base + g_ntoskrnl_exe_len)) { // jmp rcx rpc::CallReportByThreadID(index,RESULT_JMP_RCX); } ThreadStackWalkStruct stack_walk[]; GetThreadRip(ThreadObject,stack_walk); if(CheckRipOutSideSystemMoudles(stack_walk)) { rpc::CallReportByThreadID(index,RESULT_OUTSIDE_MOUDLE); } if(stack_walk->chect_jmp == true){ //多次跳板 rpc::CallReportByThreadID(index,RESULT_CHECT_JMP); } ObDereferenceObject(ThreadObject); continue; }}虚拟机检测
检测是否存在外挂虚拟机
ULONG rdtsc_diff_vmexit() { auto t1 = __rdtsc(); int r[4]; __cpuid(r, 1); return __rdtsc() - t1;}bool TimeBaseAttack() { int i; unsigned long long avg = 0; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { avg = avg + rdtsc_diff_vmexit(); sleep(500); } avg = avg / 10; return (avg < 2100 && avg > 0);}if(TimeBaseAttackNum > 5 && CheckKnownHypervistor() == false){ //如果检测到虚拟机但是没有发现正常虚拟机标志 //...}pool内存检测
外挂可以通过有漏洞的驱动加载,检测之
void ScanCheatPool(){ ULONG len = 4 * 1024 * 1024; auto tmpMemory = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(POOL_TYPE::NonPagedPool, len, POOL_TAG); if (NT_SUCCESS(pfn_NtQuerySystemInformation((SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS)0x42, tmpMemory, len, &len))) { auto pBuf = reinterpret_cast(tmpMemory); for (ULONG i = 0; i < pBuf->Count; i++) { bool bCehck1 = CheckBlackTagName(pBuf->AllocatedInfo[i].TagUlong); // 检查名字. 0mVZ SldT rcIC csIC enoN d68x bool bCheck2 = CheckPoolPeHead(tmpMemory); //检查pe头 if (bCehck1 || bCheck2) { //dump给服务端 rpc::CallReportByPool(tmpMemory,bCehck1,bCheck2); } } } ExFreePoolWithTag(tmpMemory, POOL_TAG);} 进程、线程隐藏
抄了老外的,
NTSTATUS RemovePspCidTable(PEPROCESS pep, HANDLE pid){ __try { void *PspCidTable = *((void **)MAKEPTR(KernelBase, OFS_PspCidTable)); if (!ExDestroyHandle(PspCidTable, pid, NULL)) { return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } *((ULONG64 *)MAKEPTR(pep, 0x180)) = 0; // _EPROCESS->UniqueProcessId = 0 (avoid CID_HANDLE_DELETION bsod) LIST_ENTRY *ThreadListHead = (LIST_ENTRY *)MAKEPTR(pep, 0x308); // _EPROCESS->ThreadListHead LIST_ENTRY *pLE = ThreadListHead; while ((pLE = pLE->Flink) != ThreadListHead) { PETHREAD pet = (PETHREAD)MAKEPTR(pLE, -0x428); // _ETHREAD->ThreadListEntry offset HANDLE tid = PsGetThreadId(pet); HANDLE tpid = PsGetThreadProcessId(pet); DbgPrint("pid: %I64x, tid: %I64x, tpid: %I64x", pid, tid, tpid); if (pid == tpid) // just making sure.. { DbgPrint("Removing thread: %I64x (tid: %I64x)", pet, tid); if (!ExDestroyHandle(PspCidTable, tid, NULL)) { return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } //*((ULONG64 *)MAKEPTR(pet, 0x3b8 + 0x00)) = 0; // _ETHREAD->Cid.UniqueProcess = 0 *((ULONG64 *)MAKEPTR(pet, 0x3b8 + 0x08)) = 0; // _ETHREAD->Cid.UniqueThread = 0 (avoid CID_HANDLE_DELETION bsod) } } } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } return STATUS_SUCCESS;}"如何实现游戏反作弊"的内容就介绍到这里了，感谢大家的阅读。如果想了解更多行业相关的知识可以关注网站，小编将为大家输出更多高质量的实用文章！
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